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I. INTRODUCTION

The September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States shocked the
world's conscience and changed the American public's feeling of
vulnerability. Following the events that unfolded on September 11, the
United States took drastic steps to help insure a terrorist attack of that
magnitude would not happen again. On September 18, 2001, Congress
issued a Joint Resolution pertaining to the Authorization for Use of Military
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Force (AUMF).' The immediate action taken by Congress gave the
President the power to:
[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons,
in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or
2
persons.
Following the September 18, 2001 Joint Resolution, the United States
military commenced aggressive attacks on Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in.
Afghanistan.3 Fighting a non-traditional war, the United States found it
necessary to implement new procedures that would enable the military to
gather information from captured enemies in hopes of preventing additional
attacks.4 Using the power authorized by the AUMF, the President
published a military order on November 13, 2001, regulating the
"Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-citizens in the War against
Terrorism." 5 The President's military order led to the capture and detention
of over 500 enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). 6
The Bush administration established the "enemy combatant"
designation to prevent prisoners captured in the "war on terror" from
obtaining the legal authority to challenge their detention.7 As a result, the
military stripped the detainees of rights protected by the U.S. courts, the
judicial systems of their home countries, and the protection of international
laws such as the Geneva Conventions.8 On July 7, 2004, Deputy Secretary

I.

See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224

2.

See id.

(2001).

3.
Thomas L. Hemingway, War Time Detention of Enemy Combatants: What if There Were
a War and No One Could Be Detained Without an Attorney, 34 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 63, 63
(2006).
4.

See Authorization for Use of Military Force § 115 Stat. at 224.

5.
Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
6.
Hemingway, supra note 3, at 64 (citing to Scott McClellan, Press Briefing, White House
(June 21, 2005)).
7.

See Tom Eley, Obama Administration Ends Use of "Enemy Combatant" Designation,

WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE, Mar. 16, 2009, http://www.wsws.org/articlesI2009/mar2009/comb-

m16.shtml (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
8.

See generally id.
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of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, issued a memorandum defining an "enemy
combatant" as anyone who:
[W]as part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has
committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in
aid of enemy armed forces. Each detainee subject to this Order
has been determined to be an enemy combatant through multiple
9
levels of review by officers of the Department of Defense.
Following the Wolfowitz memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
published an expanded definition of the "enemy combatant" designation
that stated, for the purposes of the "war on terror," an enemy combatant
includes, but is not necessarily limited to, a member or agent of A1-Qaeda,
Taliban, or another international terrorist organization against which the
United States is engaged in an armed conflict.'l
When the numbers of detainees rose in GTMO, humanitarian
proponents and those in the international legal community took notice and
began questioning the legality of the "enemy combatant" designation and
whether it violated international law." With the help of pro bono counsel,
detainees soon began filing writs of habeas corpus in U.S. federal court.' 2
The detainees wanted to challenge the legality of their detention under the
"enemy combatant" designation; 3 reasoning that because they were not
enemy combatants and had not committed offenses under the international
laws of war, they were held unlawfully.' 4 The detainees' counsel based the
challenges on the failure of the United States to charge them with any
offenses and to provide them with access to counsel and the courts. 5

9.
Memorandum from the Assistant Sec'y of Defense to the Sec'y of the Navy on the Order
Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004).
10.

See id. % 1-12.

11.

Eley, supra note 7.

12.

See Hemingway, supra note 6, at 65 (citing examples of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Al Odah v.
United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
13.

Id.

14.

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated by 542 U.S. 507

(2004); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 698 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd by 542 U.S. 426 (2004); A] Odah
v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1136 (D.C. Ci. 2003), rev'dby Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
15.

See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 459; Padilla,352 F.3d at 698; Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1135.
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II. ESTABLISHING THE RIGHTS OF ALIEN DETAINEES: RECENT CASE LAW
The Bush administration's attempts to limit the rights of GTMO
detainees helped the federal courts establish case precedent regarding
detainees' rights.
A. The Bush Administration: Attempting to Strip Habeas Corpus Rights
Rasul v. Bush was a land mark decision rendered by the United States
Supreme Court (Supreme Court) on June 28, 2004.16 At the time, the
Supreme Court's decision gave all detainees at GTMO access to the federal
court system through habeas corpus petitions. 7 Shafiq Rasul was a British
national who allegedly traveled to Pakistan and then Afghanistan in 2001 to
aid in humanitarian efforts following the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks.' 8 Rasul was captured by bounty hunters in Afghanistan and turned
over to U.S. forces for a reward.' 9 U.S. forces eventually transferred Rasul
to GTMO in January of 2002, where he remained until his release in 2004.2o
It was during his detention in GTMO that the Center for Constitutional
Rights filed a petition on behalf of Rasul for his release. 2' Rasul was
released before the petition made its way to the Supreme Court; however,
certiorariwas granted because other detainees who had been captured with
Rasul were still detained in GTMO.22 In issuing its opinion, the Supreme
Court established that non-resident aliens held by the United States in
foreign territories retained habeas corpus rights.23 The Supreme Court
explained that although the United States does not have ultimate
sovereignty at the GTMO camp in Cuba, it does have exclusive and plenary
16.

Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466 (2004).

17.

See generally id.

18.
See Globaljihad.net, Tipton Three, Apr. 29, 2008, http://www.globaljihad.net/
view_page.asp?id=872 (last visited Oct. 16, 2009); see also 'Torture' Trio Lose U.S. Appeal,
BIRMINGHAM MAIL, Jan. 12, 2008.

19. Jerry Seper, Terror Suspects Can't Sue Pentagon: Four Say Military Used Torture,
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2008, at A02; Timeline: Uighur Detainees in Guantanamo,AL ARABIYA NEWS
CHANNEL, July 7, 2009, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/07/07/78096.html (last visited Oct. 16,
2009) [hereinafter Timeline].
20. See Stephen Grey, Flight Logs Reveal Secret Rendition, SUNDAY TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2936782.ece (last visited Oct. 12, 2009); see
also Globaljihad.net, Tipton Three, supra note 18; BIRMINGHAM MAIL, 'Torture' Trio Lose U.S.
Appeal, supra note 18.
21.
Plaintiffs-Appellants' Response and Reply Brief at 1; Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 512 F.3d 644
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 06-5209).
22.

Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471, n.1.

23.

Id. at 480-81.
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jurisdiction as outlined in the land use lease agreement between the United
States and Cuba.24 This decision afforded many detainees
held at GTMO
25
relief.
corpus
habeas
for
petitions
file
to
the opportunity
B. The Bush Administration: Subsequent Attempts to Strip Habeas Corpus
Rights
Responding to the Supreme Court opinion in Rasul, President Bush
signed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA).26 The DTA prohibited
inhumane treatment of prisoners, required that interrogations comply with
U.S. Army regulations, and stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to hear
habeas corpus petitions from GTMO detainees. 27 The latter of the three
provisions was specifically outlined in subsection (e) and stated that, "no
court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider ... an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed on behalf of an alien detained
by the United States" at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.28 The Executive branch
wanted to limit the protections established for alien detainees by the Rasul
decision by taking away habeas corpus relief and although the DTA
succeeded the result was short-lived.29
In June of 2006, the Supreme Court heard Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and
declared that the DTA had only a prospective effect.30 Hamdan was of
Yemini decent and was captured during the United States invasion of
Afghanistan. 31 Hamdan admitted that he was Osama Bin Laden's personal
driver and bodyguard.3 2 Hamdan was one of the original detainees at
GTMO and legal efforts on his behalf led to a land mark case that derailed
President Bush's efforts to strip alien detainees in GTMO of habeas corpus
relief.33 Following the Hamdan decision, the Bush administration went
back to the drawing board and established The Military Commissions Act

24.
Christopher M. Schumann, Note, Bring It on: The Supreme Court Opens the Floodgates
with Rasul v. Bush, 55 A.F. L. REV. 349,355 (2004) (citing Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471).
25.
Karen DeYong, Court Told It Lacks Power in Detainee Cases, WASH. POST, Oct. 20,
2006, at A18.
26.

28 U.S.C. § 2241, amendedby 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e)(1) (West 2008).

27.

See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1002(a), 1003(a) (2005).

28.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e)(1).

29.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 557-58 (2006).

30.

Id. at 558.

31.

Id. at 557.

32.

Id. at 570.

33.

See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 575-76.
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of 2006 (MCA). 34 The MCA further defined the "enemy combatant"
designation and stripped access to habeas relief for any alien detainee who
was classified as an "enemy combatant" under the definition outlined in the
MCA.3 ' Responding to Hamdan, the Bush administration clearly defined
what type of detainee was stripped of habeas relief and the resulting MCA
gave enough breathing room for those aliens not classified as "enemy
combatants" access to the federal courts through habeas petitions.3 6
Again, the Bush administration's attempt to strip the habeas corpus
rights of detainees was short-lived when the Supreme Court issued the
opinion in Boumediene v. Bush.3 7 Lakhdar Boumediene was a non-resident
alien designated an "enemy combatant" and detained at Guantanamo.3 8
Boumediene challenged the United States government's attempt to strip
him of habeas corpus relief during his detention. 39 The Court found § 7 of
the MCA to be unconstitutional because it violated Article I, § 9 of the U.S.
Constitution without creating a new provision or highlighting an existing
40
provision that would act as an adequate substitute for habeas corpus relief.
Article I, Section 9 requires that the "Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion of the public Safety may require it". 41 The Court held that alien
detainees although non-citizens held outside United States borders, were
afforded the protections of the United States Constitution, including habeas
corpus rights.42 The Court recognized that Article I, Section 9 has not been
extended to protect non-resident aliens held outside United States
territories. 43 Guantanamo is outside the United States; however, the Court
made a distinction from prior cases because the United States government
exerts complete control over the territory and the Cuban government has no
judicial jurisdiction. 4" After recognizing that Guantanamo detainees retain

34.

Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17, 2006).

35.

Id.

36.

Id.; see generallyHamdan, 548 U.S. at 567.

37.

128 S.Ct. 2229, 2229 (2008).

38.

Id. at 2240.

39.

Id.

40.

Id. at 2274.

41.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.

42.

Bourmediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2262.

43.

Id. at 2260.

44.

Seeid. at2261.
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their habeas corpus rights, the Court moved forward to determine whether
the detainees had an adequate substitute.45
The Bush administration attempted to establish substitute procedures
called Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) under the DTA.46 The
DTA also gave review jurisdiction of CSRT proceedings to the D.C. Circuit
Court. 47 The Court, however, found the CSRT flawed and the judicial
review process an insufficient substitute for habeas corpus rights. 4' The
CSRT was incomplete because it provided no right to council, the detainee
had a limited right to see the evidence against him, and was limited in the
evidence he could present. 49 After discussing the CSRT flaws the Court
moved to an evaluation of whether the D.C. Circuit Court's ability to
engage in judicial review was adequate to substitute for habeas corpus
rights.5 °
"For the writ of habeas corpus, or its substitute, to function as an
effective and proper remedy in this context, the court that conducts the
habeas proceeding must have the means to correct errors that occur during
the CSRT proceedings". 51 The Court went on to explain that the judicial
body making the review must have "some authority to assess the
sufficiency of the Government's evidence against the detainee. It also must
have the authority to admit and consider relevant exculpatory evidence that
was not introduced during the earlier proceeding".52 The Court found that
the DTA did not allow for a judicial review that could include "newly
discovered evidence or make a finding that the detainee was improperly
designated as an enemy combatant".53 The review procedures for the
CSRT's, outlined in the DTA, do not afford the necessary authorities and
are an "unconstitutional suspension of the writ".54 The Boumediene ruling
established that detainees "should be entitled to challenge both the

45.

Id.

46.

28 U.S.C. § 2241, amended by 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e)(1) (West 2008).

47.

§ 2241.

48.

Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2274.

49.
Marjorie Cohn, Supreme Court Checks and Balances in Boumediene, JURIST LEGAL NEWS
& RES., June 16, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2008/06/supreme-court-checks-and-balancesin.php (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).
50.

Id.

51.

Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2269.

52.

Id.

53.

Cohn, supranote 49.

54.

Boumediene, 128 S.Ct at 2274.
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government's5 definition of an enemy combatant and the factual basis of
their arrest"."
III. THE UIGHURS ROAD To GUANTANAMO
The Uighur population is a predominately Muslim community
established in the Xinjiang region of Western China56 that has come under
fire during the "war on terror."
A. The Uighurs
Over the last thirty years the Han Chinese, who comprise ninety-eight
percent of China's population, have been migrating into the Xinjiang region
of Western China.57 Some Uighurs believe the Republic of China is
attempting to "refashion their cultural and religious identity. 5 8 The Han
Chinese are China's ethnic majority and some Uighurs feel the communist
government of China has encouraged the migration to promote Buddhism,
which is China's predominant religion. 9 In addition, the Han migrants
flowing into the region have drained the already limited land and water the
Uighur territory possesses. 60 The increasing flow of Han Chinese into the
region resulted in some Uighurs calling for an independent Uighur state. 6 1
Other portions of the Uighur population chose to leave the Xinjiang
territory and cross the border into the neighboring countries of Afghanistan
and Pakistan.6 2 Some of those who crossed into Afghanistan and Pakistan
were exposed to Islamic extremists groups, such as the Taliban and the
Northern Alliance (the anti-Taliban opposition force), while others used the
new territory to start an independent life.63

55.

Richard A. Epstein, How to Complicate Habeas Corpus, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2008, at

A.19.
56. Preeti Bhattachaji, Uighurs and China'sXinjiang Region, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2009,
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/171-emerging/29896.pdf
(last
visited Sept. 30, 2009).
57.

Id. at 2.

58.

Id.

59.

See generally Bhattachaiji, supra note 56.

60.

Id.

61.

Bhattacharji, supranote 56, at 2.

62.

See id. at 4.

63.

Id.
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B. How the Uighurs Became Caught up in the "War on Terror"
During the offensive by the United States in Afghanistan following the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a village on the outskirts of Tora Bora
was bombed and twenty-two Uighurs fled the village.64 After fleeing the
village in Tora Bora, the Uighurs were taken into custody by Pakistani
bounty hunters and turned over to U.S. forces for a cash reward. 65 While
the group was held in a United States. detention camp, the U.S. government
took advantage of the opportunity to question the Chinese nationals in
hopes of acquiring information about the Chinese government.66 Pentagon
officials justified the detention by claiming the area the Uighurs fled "was a
separatist training camp with loose ties to the Taliban.'6 7 The United States
claimed the Uighurs were linked to a Muslim separatist group, Eastern
Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETMI), that received weapons training in
Afghanistan to fight the Republic of China.68 However, critics of the
Uighurs detainment believe the U.S. government agreed to list ETMI as a
terrorist group to gain Chinese approval for the invasion of Iraq. 69 By 2003,
counsel for the Uighurs in GTMO argued that the camp they fled was an
"innocent handful of houses bisected by dirt tracks., 70 Furthermore, the
attorneys explained that the only "[w]eaponry .. .consisted of a single
Kalashnikov rifle and a pistol."' 71 In response, the Pentagon reviewed the
twenty-two Uighur detainees and determined that five posed no threat and
should be released.72

64.

See Timeline, supranote 19.

65.

Id.

66.
Andy Worthington, Bad News and Good News for the Guantanamo Uighurs,
Andyworthington.co.uk Feb. 19, 2009, http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2009/02/19/bad-news-andgood-news-for-the-guantanamo-uighurs/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
67.

Timeline, supra note 19.

68.
Foxnews.com, British Government Raises Concerns Over Detainee Transfer to Bermuda,
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/06/1 l/officials-uighur-detainees-guantanamo-sent-bermuda/
(last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
69.
Gitmo

Worthington, supra note 66; see also Anthony Kuhn, US., China Debate Over Uighur

Detainees, NAT'L

PUB.

RADiO,

Feb.

20,

2009,

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/

story.php?storyld= 100790460 (last visited Sept. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Kuhn].
70.

William Glaberson & Margot Williams, Exile Detainees at Guantanamo Pose a Dilemma,

N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 1, 2009, at Al.
71.

Id.

72.

Id.
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IV. LEGAL LIMBO: WHERE SHOULD THE UIGHURS BE RELEASED?

China has demanded that the United States repatriate the Uighurs
detained at GTMO. The United States has refused to send the Uighurs back
to China because of the persecution they would likely face. Therefore, the
United States has attempted to transfer the Uighurs to other foreign nations
but many have been hesitant to accept them.
A. ChinaDemands Repatriatio
China wants the Uighurs returned to their native country.73 The
international War on Terror has allowed oppressive governments to label
any type of anti-state movement as a terrorist activity and China has taken
this opportunity to single out Uighurs.74 The Chinese government considers
75
the Uighurs as separatists and feels the population is a terrorist group.
After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, "China
identified itself as a victim of international terrorism and the Uighur
separatist movement as its own al-Qaeda. ' '76 China claims that the Uighurs
are an extremist group who have plotted and carried out numerous terrorist
attacks on Chinese government officials since the early 1990's.77 The
tension that exists between a portion of the Uighur population and the
Chinese government is never far from the surface.78 Leading up to the 2008
Olympic Games in Beijing, the Chinese government reported an increase in
secret separatist activity that it attributed to the Uighur population. 79 The
Chinese government believes that the active separatists in the Uighur
population have established a goal of disrupting the communist government
of China in hopes of gaining an independent Uighur state in the Xinjiang
region.80 A flurry of terrorist plots by the Uighurs were reported prior to the
opening of the Olympic Games; however, many in the international
community believed the reports were exaggerated to justify restrictive

73.
Liu Zhen & Ben Blanchard, China Demands U.S. Send Guantanamo Uighurs Back,
REUTERS, June 11, 2009.
74.

Kuhn, supra note 69.

75.
Richard L. Parry, Uighur Riots Sparked by Fears That SeparatistDream Is Dying, TIMES
ONLINE, July 6, 2009, http://www .timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6649318.ece (last
visited Sept. 30, 2009).
76.

Id.

77.

Id.

78.

Id.

79.

Id.

80.

Parry, supra note 75.
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security at the Games. 81 Many who thought the threats were overplayed by
the Chinese government were shocked by a bombing and knife attack led
by two Uighur men that killed sixteen Chinese government police officers
right before the Games began.82 The initial attack was followed by two
additional attacks that also led to fatalities of Chinese government
officials.83
More recently, conflict between the Uighur separatists and China have
resulted in over 140 deaths, China's worst riots since the Tiananmen Square
massacre. 84 The international community has limited information on many
of the claims made by China in regards to the Uighurs and it has been hard
to determine to what extent the Uighurs are responsible for attacks they
have been named in.85 Gardner Bovingdon, a professor at Indiana
University who is an expert on the Uighur population, has explained that
the group is often misunderstood or suffers from broad generalizations
made by the Chinese government.86 Bovingdon has explained that
misconceptions about the Uighur population stem from the group's
"political views that run the gamut from Islam to nationalism, peaceful to
violent resistance, and autonomy to independence. 87 Likewise, many
humanitarian watch dog groups believe the majority of the Uighur
population is a peaceful group who wish to practice their religion free of
censorship and the political oppressions of China. 8 International human
rights organizations have voiced concern that the Uighur population as a
whole has been cast in an unfair light and the "Chinese anti-terror campaign
has blurred the lines between genuine men of violence and those who
peacefully support independence. 89
Irrespective of the international view, China has been adamant that the
detained Uighurs be returned to their home country. 90 The Chinese
government wants the United States to repatriate those detained in GTMO
because China considers them terrorists who are active in the separatist
81.

Id.

82.

Id.

83.

Id.

84.

Id.

85.

See generally Parry,supranote 75.

86.

Kuhn, supranote 69.

87.

Id.

88.

Parry, supra note 75.

89.

Id.

90.
Peter Spiegel & Barbra Demick, Poisedfor Release-but to Where?; The Chinese Uighurs
Held at GuantanamoPresent a Special Challenge for the Obama Administration, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18,
2009, at A5.
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movement against China. 9' China claims that the United States' refusal to
return the Uighurs flies in the face of active resolutions of the United
Nations Security Council and also violates the rules governing international
anti-terrorism. 92 The Chinese government wants the men returned to face
trial for their alleged separatist activities against the ruling government.93
In 2005, five of the Uighurs originally captured by bounty hunters in
Afghanistan and turned over to American forces were cleared by the United
States and released to Albania.94 China responded by sharply criticizing the
United States for releasing five individuals who the Chinese government
considered dangerous terrorists. 9 China has gone further and made it clear
that they oppose any country that is willing to offer the detained Uighurs
political asylum.96 China has taken the position that by refusing to
repatriate the Uighurs, the United States is sheltering a group that threatens
Chinese national security.97

China believes the international community

has a duty to return the Uighurs9 8 and has argued the reaction would be
quite different if China was harboring a group that threatened the national
security of the United States.99 The Chinese government has voiced its
disapproval of the United States' refusal to return the Uighurs and has also
stated that they, China, oppose any other third country accepting the Uighur
detainees.' 00
B. The United States Will Not Send the Uighurs to China
The United States has rejected attempts by the Chinese government to
have the detained Uighurs retumed.'0 ' The Uighurs currently detained in
GTMO cannot be returned to China because there is a strong likelihood that

91.

Zhen & Blanchard, supra note 73.

92.

Id.

93.

Spiegel & Demick, supranote 90 at AS.

94.
Corey Flintoff, Fate of Guantanamo'sUighurs Is Still Unclear,NAT'L PUB. RADIO, June
11, 2009, http://www.npr.org /templates/story/story.php?storyd=105269359 (last visited Sept. 30,
2009).
95.

See Spiegel & Demick, supra note 90, at A5.

96.

Id.

97.

Zhen & Blanchard, supranote 73.

98.

Id.

99.

Kuhn, supranote 69.

100.

Zhen & Blanchard, supranote 73.

101. See posting of Jenny S. Martinez to After Detention, The Mess Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 2009, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/31/after-detention-where-can-theuighurs-go/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).

Tucker

2009]

they would be subjected to torture or unfair persecution. 10 2 The treaty
obligations of the United States prevent the government from transferring a
detainee to any State where that detainee would face persecution. 10 3 Under
the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane
or Degrading Treatment (CAT), the United States is prohibited from
sending the Uighurs back to China because they would be subject to arrest,
torture, or execution. 104 Part I Article 1 of the CAT defines torture as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him
or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind, when such pain and suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence 05of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.1
The CAT does not only prohibit the direct torture of individuals, but it
also forbids the transfer of an individual to a country where they would be
subjected to any type of activity that would be considered torture pursuant
to the outlined definition. 10 6 Part I Article 3 of the CAT states that, "No
State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture."'0 7
All indications from humanitarian groups and United Nations officials
portray a Chinese State that is marked by human rights violations that rise

102. See posting of Andrew C. McCarthy to After Detention, A Case Built on Irrationality,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2009, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/3 1/after-detention-wherecan-the-uighurs-go/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
103. See posting of Deborah Colson to After Detention, A Case Built on Irrationality, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2009, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/31/after-detention-where-canthe-uighurs-go/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
104. Id.; see generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, availableat http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cat.pdf (last visited Sept.
21, 2009) (entered into force on June 26, 1987) [hereinafter CAT].
105.

CAT, supra note 104, art. 1.

106. Abandoned at Guantanamo: Guantanamo Detainees Trapped by Inaction, Center for
Constitutional Rights (CCR, New York, N.Y.), Nov. 2008, at 3,
available at
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Guantkinamo's%20Refugees%203d%20ed%20_FINAL_.pdf. See also CAT,
supra note 105, art. II.
107.

CAT, supra note 105, art. II.
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to the level outlined in the CAT. 10 8 Evidence provided by Amnesty
International and the United Nations detail systematic torture techniques
employed by Chinese officials against Uighurs that are violations of the
CAT. 0 9 In a 2005 report, "Manfred Nowak, the United Nations Special
Reporter on Torture, confirmed that 'torture was wide spread' in China." ' 1 0
Additionally, Mr. Nowak explained that there was a "consistent and
systematic pattern of torture related to ethnic minorities, particularly
Tibetans and Uyghurs. ' 11 Mr. Nowak cited electric shock, guard instructed
beatings, and submersion in water or sewerage among the forms of torture
employed by Chinese officials against Uighurs detained in China." 2 There
have been further indications that Uighurs returned to China not only face
torture but may also be subject to execution at the hands of the Chinese
government. 13 China is known for frequent executions of people opposing
the communist regime, and the Xinjiang region that is home to the Uighurs
is said to have the greatest number of these executions." 14 Multiple human
rights organizations have detailed accounts of Uighurs being executed
under death sentences resulting from unfair trials alleging separatist or
5
terrorist activities. 1i
In addition to the CAT, the United States must also adhere to the
United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
(Convention). 16 The Convention is the basis for all international protection
17
given to refugees and has been signed by 144 independent States.'
Additionally, the U.N. General Assembly Resolution section 8 () of 1946
states that, "no refugees or displaced persons who have finally and
definitely ... expressed valid objections to returning to their countries of
108. Torture
Against
Uighurs
in
East
Turkestan
Blog,
http://merryabla64.
wordpress.com/2009/06/26/torture-against-uyghurs-in-east-turkestan/ (June 26, 2009, 05:38 EST) (last
visited Sept. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Torture Against Uighurs].
109.

Id.

110.

Id.

Ill.

Id.

112. Id.
113.
RISK

OF

INT'L HELSINKI FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, UIGHURS SENT BACK TO CHINA AT
BEING
TORTURED
(2006),
available at
http://www.ihf-hr.org/documentsdoc_

summary.php?did=4251 &sec id=58 (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
114.

Id.

115.

Id.

116. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, AUDIOVISUAL LIBR.
OF INT'L L. at I, availableat http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/prsr/prsr-e.pdf (last visited Sept. 18,
2009). See also Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.S.-China, Dec. 14, 1950,
189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Convention Relating to Status of Refugees].
117.

Goodwin-Gill, supra note 116, at I.

Tucker

2009]

origin . .. shall be compelled to return
..,,
.
According to Senior
Research Fellow at Oxford University, Guy Goodwin-Gill, a refugee is
"any person who is outside their country of origin and unable or unwilling
to return there or to avail themselves of its protection, on account of a wellfounded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular group, or political opinion.' 19 To be
considered a refugee under the Convention, the person must have crossed a
physical border leaving the origin country behind. 20 The motivation
behind fleeing the origin country does not have to be rooted in experiencing
121
persecution but must be based on a well founded fear of persecution.
Although the Convention does not specifically outline what is considered
persecution, the Convention does refer to those people whose "life or
freedom 'was' or 'would be' threatened, so clearly it includes the threat of
death, or the threat of torture, or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or
punishment.' ' 22 The incidents of torture and execution highlighted in this
section placed the Uighurs in fear of the persecution that may result from
repatriation. 23 Some of the detained Uighurs explained that they would
prefer to remain in GTMO because "[g]oing back to China would more
than double the suffering of the Uighur People's spirits ....
Although
China has demanded the detained Uighurs be returned, the United States
must adhere to the CAT and the Convention by refusing repatriation.
C. Steps the UnitedStates has Taken in the Past to Release Detained
Uighurs
The United States has recognized the need to resettle the detained
Uighurs in a safe third country and the first foreign nation to accept a
portion of the detained Uighurs was Albania in 2006.125 The United States
has attempted to negotiate the release of detained Uighurs with over 100
foreign nations and territories since 2004 and on May 5, 2006, five Uighurs
118. Id. (referencing G.A. Res. 8 (1) of Feb. 12, 1946).
119.

Id. at 3 (referencing Convention Relating to Status of Refugees, supranote 116, at art. 1).

120.

Id. (referencing Convention Relating to Status of Refugees, supranote 116, at art. 1).

121.

Id. (referencing Convention Relating to Status of Refugees, supra note 116, at art. 1).

122. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 116, at 29 (referencing Convention Relating to Status of
Refugees, supra note 116, at art. 31, 33).
123. Joshua Lipes, Guantanamo Uyghurs' Release Blocked, RADIO FREE ASIA, Oct. 9, 2008,
http:l/www.rfa.orglenglish/news/uyghur/Guantanamo-10072008123140.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2009).
124.

Id.

125. Tim Golden, Chinese Leave GuantanamoforAlbanian Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2007,
at 1; see also Worthington, supra note 66.
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were the first of twenty-two Uighur detainees released from GTMO. 126 The
United States believed this would be the first in a series of foreign nations
that would accept the detained Uighurs; however, other countries have not
come forward and the results of the five that were transferred to Albania
have not given hope to the thirteen that remain in GTMO. 127 Hopes of
transferring the additional Uighurs to Albania were quashed when the
Chinese government reacted sharply to the country's willingness to accept
five men that Chinese officials consider terrorists. 12 Additionally, recent
reports from the five men transferred to Albania in 2006 have proved to be
surprisingly bleak. 129 The five Uighur men now living in Albania have said
that their time in Albania has been worse than the time spent in GTMO. 13 °
The men have been housed in an Albanian refugee camp since May of 2006
and promises of job training and monthly stipends from the United States
and the United Nations have not materialized.' 3 ' The reports show that
there has been no progress made in reuniting the Uighurs with their
families, nor have they received a grant of political asylum that was part of
the deal brokered between the United States and Albania. 132 The failures of
the deal between the United States and Albania have resulted in the five
Uighur men asking to be moved to another country, which casts doubt on
how successful the United States will be 33 in finding adequate
accommodations for the Uighurs in third countries.'
After seven years of detention in GTMO, four more of the seventeen
Uighurs originally captured in Afghanistan were also released and flown to
Bermuda on June 11, 2009.134 Releasing the men from prison and
126. Id.
127.

Id.

128. Andy
Worthington,
Guantanamo's
Uyghurs:
Stranded
in
Albania,
Andyworthington.co.uk, Oct. 21, 2007, http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2007/10/21/guantanamosuyghurs-stranded-in-albania/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
129.

Id.

130. Matthew Schofield, Albania Took Uighurs from US. When No One Else Would,
MCCLATCHY WASH. BUREAU, June 8, 2007, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/world/v-print/story/
16587.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
131.

Worthington, supranote 66.

132. Bruce Konviser, A Strange Kind of Freedom; Albania Wants to Expel Uighurs Sent There
by U.S., Uyghur Human Rights Project Blog, June 13, 2006, http://www.uhrp.org/articles/164/l/Astrange-kind-of-freedom--Albania-wants-to-expel-Uighurs-sent-there-by-US.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2009).
133.

Golden, supra note 125, at I.

134. Frank James, Former Gitmo Uighurs Love Bermuda (Who Wouldn't?), NPR Blog, June
15, 2009, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2009/06/former_.gitmo-uighurslove-berm.htnil
(last
visited Sept. 30, 2008).
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providing them with a chance for a normal life is the first priority for the
Obama Administration. 31 Under the agreement between the United States
and Bermuda, the four Uighur men will be able to have their families come
and visit, they will also receive housing, job training, and medical care if
needed. 136 The Bermudian government, which is a self-governing British
overseas territory, negotiated the deal with the United States in secrecy and
has cast light on some of the issues other territories may encounter if they
accept the Uighur detainees. 137 The British government learned about the
agreement upon the detainees' arrival and has criticized Bermudian officials
for failing to discuss the agreement earlier. 138 Bermuda was applauded for
showing courage in the face of potential Chinese pressure; 139 however, the
move has had international repercussions. 140 Britain voiced its displeasure
with the secrecy with which the United States and Bermuda negotiated the
transfer and has not been shy to admit the effect it will have on their
international relations with China.14 Although the transfer is complete, and
the United States has moved a portion of the detainees, the backdoor
negotiation has not won much support for the United States from other
countries. 142 Bermuda and the United States have claimed that the move
should not place Britain in a position to offend the Chinese but the final
resettlement of the four Uighurs in Bermuda will depend on the British
government giving its endorsement for naturalization-a move that will
ultimately upset the Chinese. 43 The transfer of four Uighur men to
Bermuda is a step in the right direction for the United States, but the British
reaction has also highlighted how difficult it will be to transfer the Uighurs
who remain detained in GTMO.' 44
135. Human Rights Watch, U.S.: Transfer of Uighurs to Bermuda a Positive Step Toward
Closing Guantanamo, June 12, 2009, http //www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/06/12/us-transfer-uighursbermuda-positive-step-toward-closing-guantanamo (last visited Sept. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Human
Rights Watch].
136.

Id.

137.

Id.

138.

Id.

139.

James, supra note 134.

140.

Don Lemon & Brian Vitagliano, Afier Seven Years at Gitmo, Resettled Uyghurs Grateful

for Freedom, CNN,
June
15,
2009,
http://www.cnn.com2009IWORLD/americas/06/12/
bermuda.uyghurs/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
141.

See generally id.

142.

See generallyid.

143.

James Bone, World Agenda:

Why the Uighurs Suit Bermuda, TIMES ONLINE, June 16,

2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/worldagendafarticle6511483.ece
30, 2009).
144.

Human Rights Watch, supra note 135.

(last visited Sept.
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There are thirteen Uighurs still detained in GTMO and the United
States believes it may have found a third country that is willing to resettle
the men. 145 On June 10, 2009, the small island nation of Palau announced
that it would accept the seventeen Uighurs (four subsequently departed for
Bermuda on June 11, 2009) who remained in detention at GTMO. 146 The
South Pacific island has stated that the "temporary resettlement of [the]
detainees is a humanitarian gesture intended to [help] them be [free] from
any further unnecessary incarceration and to restart their lives anew in as
normal a fashion as possible. 147 The United States and Palauan officials
are hopeful the details will work out, but both nations are taking the
position that the negotiations are ongoing. 148 Both sides are confident that
they will come to an agreement, but a successful outcome may be derailed
by an unlikely source-the detainees have expressed concern about a
transfer to Palau.149 Only one of the thirteen Uighurs detained in GTMO
has expressed an interest in being transferred to Palau. 50 The Uighurs are
concerned that they do not have a realistic prospect for economic or cultural
success in Palau. 51 The Uighurs remaining in GTMO have made it clear
that they would like to be resettled in a place where they can interact with
other Uighurs and have pointed to the failure of the Albanian transfer as an
example of what they would like to avoid." 2 The men worry that since they
will not be issued Palauan passports they will not be able to travel and will
not have an opportunity to see their families. 53 Abu Bakker Qassim, one of
the thirteen Uighurs detained in GTMO, has mentioned that "Palau might
seem a paradise to some people but it's just another kind of prison if you
154
can't travel. For us, getting a passport is the most important next step."
The proposed transfer to Palau is further complicated by fears that the

145. Cnn.com, Palau to Take Uighur Detainees from Gitmo, June 11, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITIC-S/06/10/uighurs.palau/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2009)
[hereinafter Uighur Detainees].
146. Demetri Sevastopulo, Palau to take Guantanamo Uighurs, FIN. TIMES, June 10, 2009.
147. Mike Levin, PalauAgrees to Take Uighur Gitmo Detainees,FOXNEWS.COM, June 9, 2009,
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/06/09/report-obama-administration-talks-palau-resettle-uighurdetainees (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
148.

Uighur Detainees, supranote 145.

149.

Elizabeth Fry, US-held Uighurs RebuffMove to Palau,FIN. TIMES, June 24, 2009, at 8.

150.

Id.

151.

Geoff Earle, Paradise 'Lost'for Gitmo Gang,N.Y. POST, June 11, 2009, at 8.

152.

See generally id.

153.

Fry,supra note 149 at 8.

154.

Kerin Hope, GuantanamoUighursFind Freedom in Albania, FIN. TIMES, July 10, 2009, at
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island nation will not be able to adequately protect the Uighurs if and when
they are transferred there. 155 The thirteen Uighurs have expressed fear that
the island does not have a standing army or navy that would protect them if
Chinese officials attempted to arrest them in Palau and extradite them to
China.1 6 Palau officials have assured the Uighurs that the country is under
United States protection; however, the Uighurs are hesitant to agree to the
transfer because of the islands close proximity to mainland China.1 57
D. Safe Third Countriesare Hesitantto Take the Uighurs
Since the Uighurs were reclassified as non-enemy combatants in 2004
the United States has been searching for a safe third country that would
accept the detainees.158 The United States has struggled to find a foreign
nation that will accept the Uighurs for two primary reasons. First, China
has made it clear that they oppose any country that is willing to take the
Uighurs in as refugees or grant political asylum.1 59 The Chinese
government has not been candid about the situation and went as far as
warning in February of 2009 that there would be repercussions if any
country accepted the Uighurs seeking political asylum because they would
be harboring terrorists.1 60 Second, many U.S. allies have balked at the
prospect of accepting any of the Uighurs because the United States has been
adamant in refusing to admit any of the remaining detainees into the
country. 161
V. REALISTIC OPTIONS FOR THE UIGHURS RELEASE

Although the United States has transferred nine of the original twentytwo Uighurs captured in the "war on terror," the majority of the
international community does not consider these transfers successful and
the likelihood of transferring the remaining detainees looks bleak. The
155.

See Fry, supra note 149, at 8.

156.

Id.

157.

Id.

158.

See generally Timeline, supra note 19.

159. Nick Macfie, Beijing Wants Return of Chinese Held in Guantanamo, REUTERS, Feb. 5,
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE5141H620090205 (last visited Oct. 13,
2009).
160.

Michelle Shephard, Canada Won't Accept Uighur Gitmo Detainees, THESTAR.COM,

http://www.thestar.com/comment/columnists/article/645895 (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
161.

See generally Free the Uighurs-They Lose One in Court. They Should Win in the White

House, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2009, at A14.
See also SHIRLEY A. KAN, U.S.-CHINA
COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION: ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICY 12 (Congressional Research Service

2009).
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Albanian transfer has been criticized because of the failure of the United62
States and the United Nations in providing support and reintegration.'
The Bermudian transfer has also been criticized due to the temporary nature
of the agreement and the displeasure of the British government surrounding
the agreement. 163 The United States is in a tight spot because the difficulty
of finding a safe third country willing to accept the Uighur detainees' 64 and
1 65
the prohibition of sending them back to China leaves only two options
The United States can either unlawfully hold the Uighurs indefinitely until a
safe third country comes forward or they can be admitted into the United
States.
A. Indefinite Detention
The Geneva Convention and other international laws have outlined the
humanitarian rules that apply to individuals affected by international
conflict but not necessarily directly involved in the hostilities.166 There are
also additional procedures that delineate protections available for aliens
held outside the borders of their captive nation. 67 These international
provisions limit the ability of a nation to hold detainees indefinitely without
charging them with a violation of law. 168 These regulations prevent the
United States from arbitrarily detaining GTMO prisoners. 169 Relying on
these provisions, counsel for two Uighur detainees filed habeas corpus
petitions with the United States District Court demanding their clients'
release. 170 In denying the petition, the Court offered answers to two
fundamental questions regarding the 7legality of indefinite detention of
GTMO detainees by the United States.' '

162.

Worthington, supranote 128; see also Konviser, supra note 132.

163. Lemon & Vitagliano, supra note 140; Donaghy, Nina, British Government Raises
Concerns Over Detainee Transfer to Bermuda, FOXNEWS.COM, http://www.foxnews.com/
politics/2009/06/I 1/officials-uighur-detainees-guantanamo-sent-bernuda/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
164.

Spiegel & Demick, supranote 90, at A5.

165.

CAT, supra note 104, art. IlI.

166. See Michael J.D. Sweeney, Detention at Guantanamo Bay: A Linguistic Challenge to
Law, HUMAN RIGHTS MAG.,
Winter 2003, available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/
winter03/detention.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
167. See Daryl L. Hecht, Controlling the Executive's Power to Detain Aliens Offshore: What
Processis Due the GuantanamoPrisoners?,50 S.D. L. REv. 78, 100 (2005).
168.

Id.

169.

See id.

170.

Qassim v. Bush (Qassim 1), 382 F. Supp. 2d 126, 127 (D.D.C. 2005).

171.

Qassim v. Bush (Qassim I), 407 F. Supp. 2d 198, 200-03 (D.D.C. 2005).
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The Court first discussed whether or not the United States had the
legal authority to indefinitely detain aliens who were not classified as
enemy combatants. 172 The Court explained that lawful detention is based
on preventing the detainees from returning to active hostilities.' 73 The
Court was convinced that the Uighur detainees did not harbor any ill will
toward the United States and there was no likelihood that if released, they
would engage in hostilities against the United States. 174 The Court
determined that the United States
did not have the legal authority to
17
1
Uighurs.
the
detain
indefinitely
Next, the Court discussed whether or not the federal judicial system
had the authority to offer an adequate remedy for the unlawful detention of
the Uighur detainees. 176 Counsel for the Uighurs asked the Court to order
an immediate release if it found the detention to be unlawful. 77 The Court
explained that although it found the detention unlawful, it was powerless to
issue a release order. 78 Citing the separation of powers doctrine, the Court
stated that the Executive branch had plenary powers over matters of foreign
affairs. 179 The Court recognized its ability to order the detainees release in
a third country, but noted that the lack of a country willing to take the
Uighurs left it powerless. 80 With no third country offering to resettle the
Uighurs, the only option the Court had was to release them into the United
States and that decision would encroach on the plenary powers of the
Executive branch.18 ' The opinion offered by the United States District
Court made it clear that although the indefinite detention of the Uighurs
was unlawful, the Court was powerless to offer adequate relief. However,

172.
173.
custody).

See id.
See id.; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-21 (2004) (noting detention in war for protective

174.

See Qassim 11, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 201.

175.

See id. at 201 (citing unlawfulness of Uighurs indefinite detention).

176.

See id. at 202.

177. See Supplemental Memorandum from Sabin Willett in Support of Motion to Vacate Stay
Order and Issue Writ Directing Immediate Release of Petitioners-and for Other Relief at 1, Qassim v.
Bush, 382 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D.D.C. 2005) (Case No. 05 cv 0497 JR).
178.
release).

Qassim II, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 202 (explaining constitutional encumbrances preventing

179.

See id. at 202-03 (citing plenary power rests with executive in alien matters).

180.

See id. at 201 (noting release of petitioner not within courts power).

181.

See id. at 202-03.
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in its opinion, the Court did imply that adequate relief
could be granted, but
82
it would have to come from the Executive branch.
B. PoliticalAsylum
Current international law gives states the right to grant asylum and
aliens the right to request asylum. 8 3 Although aliens have the right to
request asylum, the right is not absolute.184 The Attorney General has the
power to grant asylum to an alien if the alien satisfies the requirements of a
refugee.' 85 The Uighur detainees fall within the definition of a refugee
because they are beyond the borders of their country of origin and are
unable to return to 18China
because they would meet both religious and
6
persecution.
political
Once an alien is classified as a refugee, the Attorney General has the
power to grant asylum, if the alien satisfies four requirements.' 8 7 First, the
individual seeking asylum must prove a well founded fear of persecution or
show a history of past persecution.188 Persecution has been defined as, "a
threat to the life or freedom of those who differ from the persecutor...
where death, torture, or confinement is considered an example. 90 The
Uighurs would be able to meet this first element because their past
experience with the Chinese government has created a well-founded fear of
persecution.' 9' The Uighurs fear of execution and torture would be

182. See generally id. at 200-01 (noting the Uighur detention is unlawful but the court lacks
power to order release).
183. Roman Boed, The State of the Right of Asylum in InternationalLaw, 5 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (1994) (describing right of state to grant asylum and individual to seek it).
184.

Id.at9.

185. See Davalene Cooper, Note, Promised Land or Land of Broken Promises? Political
Asylum in the UnitedStates, 76 KY. L. J. 923, 927-28 (1988).
186.

8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (2009).

187. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(2009).
188. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, USCIS Application Procedures: Political
Asylum & Refugee Status, http://www.rapidimmigration.com/usa/1enginfoasylum.htm (last visited
Oct. 20, 2009).
189.

3A AM. JUR. 2d Aliens and Citizens § 1006 (West 2008).

190. See I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437-38 (1987). See also U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services, http://www.rapidimmigration.com/usa/l-eng-info-asylum.html (last visited
Oct. 20,2009).
191.
117, arL i.

See Lipes, supra note 123. See also Convention Relating to Status of Refugees, supra note
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considered well-founded because92 China has a well established history of
executing and torturing Uighurs.1
Second, the persecution needs to be based on race, religion,
nationality, or membership in a specific social or political group. 19 3 The
Uighurs fear of persecution is founded on their religious and political
beliefs as both Muslims and separatists. 94 The Chinese government
opposes the separatist movement of the Uighurs and has employed forced
immigration into the Uighur region of China in hopes of extinguishing the
predominant Muslim practice of the Uighur people.' 95
Third, any alien requesting asylum from the United States must be
physically present within the United States. 9 6
The United States
Immigration and Nationality Act requires that an alien be physically present
in the United States, at a land border, or port of entry to be eligible for
asylum.' 97 The third element, requiring physical presence, is where the
Uighurs may fail in securing political asylum from the United States. The
Uighurs are housed at GTMO which is located in Cuba and is held under
the sovereign power of Cuba.' 98 Cuba is an independent island country that
does not share a land border or port of entry with the United States.
Although the naval base at GTMO is considered part of Cuba and not the
United States,' 99 the Uighurs may still be able to present a valid argument
for satisfying the physical presence element required for asylum.
The Supreme Court decisions in Boumediene v. Bush and Rasul v.
Bush have established case precedent supporting the contention that GTMO
is under complete control of the United States and those detained there are
afforded protection under the laws of the United States.2 °° In Rasul, the
Court held that the United States history of uncontested control at GTMO
has extended the implied protections of American laws to those detained
within the territory. 20 ' Boumediene reinforced the Rasul decision, holding
192.

See Torture against Uighurs, supranote 89.

193.

Convention Relating to Status of Refugees, supra note 116, art. 1.

194. Kuhn, supra note 69; Parry, supra note 75 (noting China's hostility towards Chinese
Muslims for separatist activities).
195.

Bhattacharji, supranote 56.

196.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (requiring physical presence for the asylum application).

197.

See id.

198. Juan R. Torruella, On the Slippery Slopes of Afghanistan: Military Commissions andthe
Exercise of PresidentialPower, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 648, 705 (2002).
199.

Id.

200. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480-81; Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240 (holding petitioners do have a
right to habeas corpus review).
201.

Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487.
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that Congress's attempt to strip habeas rights from detainees was
unconstitutional. 20 2 Additionally, GTMO must be regarded as a U.S.
territory, applying basic constitutional rights to all persons within the base's
walls, and is strikingly similar to that of a domestic United States
territory.2 3 Furthermore, American authorities stationed at GTMO are not
subject to Cuban law, nor are there any indications of Cuban culture or
tradition.2° With the exclusive control the United States exerts over the
area, the applicability of American law, and extension of the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts, the Uighurs may satisfy the physical presence requirement for
political asylum. 0 5
VI. CONCLUSION
The Uighur detainees held at GTMO are an international dilemma that
necessitates an international response. According to the U.S. federal courts,
the arbitrary and indefinite detention of the Uighurs is unlawful. Therefore,
the U.S. Executive branch must release the Uighurs from GTMO while also
ensuring they are shielded from Chinese control. Ultimately, the United
States has two options. The current administration can allow the unlawful
detention to continue until a safe third country is found, or grant the Uighur
detainees political asylum. Consequently, the Executive branch must
choose between offending the principles of international law or admitting
GTMO detainees, once considered terrorists, into the United States.

202. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240 (holding the Military Commissions Act was an
unconstitutional striping of the habeas writ).
203. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 463 (noting American control
over Guantanamo Bay distinct from Cuban law).
204.

Id.

205. See Torruella, supra note 198, at 705-06 (arguing United States exercises sovereign
powers over Guantanamo Bay); Hecht, supra note 147, at 83 (examining Supreme Court's decision to
allow jurisdiction over detainees at Guantanamo Bay); Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480-81 (recognizing
territorial nature of Guantanamo Bay).

